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Biased Perceptions of Income Distribution and Preferences 
for Redistribution: Evidence from a Survey Experiment* 
 
Individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and public 
finance models, yet there is little evidence regarding their origins or accuracy. This study 
examines how individuals form these perceptions and posits that systematic biases arise 
from the extrapolation of information extracted from reference groups. A tailored household 
survey provides original evidence on the significant biases in individuals’ evaluations of their 
own relative position in the distribution. Furthermore, the data supports the hypothesis that 
the selection process into the reference groups is the source of those biases. Finally, this 
study also assesses the practical relevance of these biases by examining their impact on 
attitudes towards redistributive policies. An experimental design incorporated into the survey 
provides consistent information on the own ranking within the income distribution to a 
randomly selected group of respondents. Confronting agents’ biased perceptions with this 
information has a significant effect on their stated preferences for redistribution. Those who 
had overestimated their relative position and thought of themselves relatively richer than they 
were demand higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking. This 
relationship between biased perceptions and political attitudes provides an alternative 
explanation for the relatively low degree of redistribution observed in modern democracies. 
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The shape of the income distribution plays a key role in the determination of policies 
with redistributive components (such as social security, health care, government transfers and 
taxation) in political economy and public finance models. However, the main policy 
determinant is not its actual shape, but rather how it is perceived by agents in the economy. 
This study fills a gap in the literature by exploring the causes and consequences of systematic 
biases in individuals’ perceptions of aggregate income distributions. 
The findings presented in this paper contribute to the recent literature on the 
incorporation of subjective perceptions and inference problems into the determination of 
political economy outcomes (for a seminal contribution see Piketty, 1995). For instance, 
when forming their views on public policies, agents may need to infer the importance of 
effort and predetermined factors in the income generation process (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2006), they may evaluate prospects of economic mobility (Bénabou and Ok, 
2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), or they may arrive at conclusions as to the causes of 
poverty and the fairness of socioeconomic outcomes in general (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). 
To form their judgments, views and attitudes, agents need to make difficult inferences about 
distributional outcomes (e.g., inequality, mobility) based on limited information and within 
given time constraints, but there is as yet little evidence on the origins or the accuracy of the 
inferences they make in this regard. 
This paper also makes a contribution to a growing body of work that attempts to 
document agents’ expectations and subjective probabilities (Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009) and 
explain their formation (Zafar, 2011). In an application to distributional issues, Norton and 
Ariely (2011) elicit information on American’s perceptions of the wealth distribution in their 
society and find significant discrepancies between actual and perceived levels of inequality. 
The results presented in this paper not only document systematic discrepancies between 
objective and subjective income distributions, but also provide a series of tests for the origins 
and the consequences of such discrepancies.  
The assessment of an income distribution by an economic agent can be regarded, 
fundamentally, as a statistical inference problem. Individuals observe the income levels of no 
more than a sub-sample of the population and must infer the entire distribution from that 
information. If agents do not fully account for the selection process involved in the formation 
of the sample they observe, their inferences will be systematically biased. This failure may be 
due to limitations in the information set available to the agents – the information might be 
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costly or unavailable. Alternatively, agents may have the necessary information, but they may 
sometimes fail to use it correctly, as argued in the cognitive bias literature (Rabin, 1998; 
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 2003). Irrespective of whether agents have limited 
information or bounded rationality, this rationalization of distributional perceptions provides 
a series of corollaries that can be tested with data on objective and perceived distributions. 
The empirical results in this paper are based on the Survey on Distributional 
Perceptions and Redistribution, a study of 1,100 households representative of the Greater 
Buenos Aires area in Argentina. The survey was designed and implemented in 2009 for the 
specific purpose of testing the posited mechanisms for the formation of distributional 
perceptions. Data were collected on each respondent’s household income and on his or her 
assessment of its ranking (to the closest decile) in the overall income distribution.  
The first finding is the presence of systematic biases in perceptions of own income 
rank: a significant portion of poorer individuals place themselves in higher positions than 
they are, while a significant proportion of richer individuals underestimate their rank. 
Moreover, as predicted by the theory, the bias is significantly correlated with the 
respondent’s relative position within the reference group (as proxied by area of residence). 
Also in keeping with the theory, respondents with friends from heterogeneous social 
backgrounds are less prone to these biases. 
Finally, the analysis explores how these misperceptions about the income distribution 
may affect attitudes towards redistribution. For instance, self-interest might induce poor 
individuals to demand less redistribution if they think they are relatively richer than they 
actually are. The document presents the results from a unique randomized experiment that 
was implemented within the survey: for a randomly assigned treatment group, the interviewer 
highlighted any discrepancy between the subjective assessment of the respondent’s ranking 
and that respondent’s actual position, effectively correcting any bias that was present. This 
survey field experiment contributes to the literature on information provision as a treatment 
(Duflo and Saez, 2003; Chetty and Saez, 2009; Card et al., 2010). An original feature is that 
perceptions are not only contrasted with reality (as in Olken, 2009, among others): the survey 
experiment provides feedback and actually confronts biased subjects with consistent 
information.  
The results from the experiment indicate that confronting agents’ biased perceptions 
with consistent information had a significant effect on stated preferences for redistribution. 
Those who overestimated their relative position (who thought of themselves to be relatively 
richer than they were) and were provided consistent information demanded more 
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redistribution than those in the control group. To the degree that the information treatment 
managed to correct biased distributional perceptions, these results can be interpreted as 
evidence of the effect of biases in distributional perceptions on political attitudes. 
Specifically, upward biases in perceptions of own rank among the less well-off reduce their 
demands for redistribution. This finding constitutes an alternative to theories that posit 
prospects of upward mobility (Bénabou and Ok, 2001) or other factors as accounting for the 
relatively low levels of demand for redistribution in modern democracies. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the formation of 
subjective income distributions and individuals’ perceptions of their income rank, and 
explores these factors’ implications for attitudes towards redistribution. The third section 
describes the household survey and the randomized experiment that was designed to answer 
these questions. The fourth section presents the empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
2 Subjective income distributions and potential biases 
2.1 Subjective income distributions and reference groups 
Economic agents’ assessments of income distributions depend on their access to 
information and on their ability to process the relevant data. The latter constitutes a trivial 
matter in a perfect information context, where the incomes of all members of society are 
observed. However, in the presence of limited information, these assessments become 
statistical inference problems. Individuals are constantly exposed to the income levels of 
others through, for instance, the media and social interaction with acquaintances, co-workers, 
employees, etc. Even if they interact primarily with individuals exhibiting similar 
characteristics, rational agents may arrive at consistent estimates of the entire distribution by 
factoring in the selection process of the non-representative sample of incomes that they 
observe. 
The distribution of income in society as a whole is given by the density function  f . 
An agent j can infer  f  (or some statistic of  f  – the mean, the median, or the agent’s 
own ranking in the distribution) using the information about the incomes that he or she has 
observed. This sub-sample of observed incomes constitutes agent j’s reference group, jS . 
The term )P(i jS  denotes the probability that a randomly chosen individual i belongs to 
group jS , and jSP denotes the proportion of the whole population that belongs to jS .  
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Let )x|P(i ijS  be the selection equation, which represents the probability that 
individual i belongs to the reference group jS  given that his or her income is ix . From the 
observed incomes, the agent can derive a consistent estimate of the distribution of incomes 
within her or his reference group, )i|f(x i jS . That density distribution is related to the 
unconditional density distribution if(x )  (i.e., the density of the entire distribution of incomes, 













       (1) 
Agent j is deemed sophisticated (subscript S)  if he or she applies Bayes’ rule to infer 













       (2) 
 To make the inference given by equation (2), agent j requires information about the 
relative size of the reference group (
jS
P ), knowledge about the selection process leading to 
the formation of that reference group ( )x|P(i ijS ), and the ability to make probability 
judgments. Any deviation from these conditions will result in biased perceptions about if(x ) . 
There are several sources of deviations from these conditions. For instance, the 
information about )x|P(i ijS  or if(x )  may be costly to acquire, or the advantages of doing 
so might not be evident. In equilibrium, they may opt for good enough naïve estimates. It 
may also be the case that, as in Benoit and Dubra (2011), the naïve estimate represents the 
best possible answer that can arise from rational agents’ extrapolations conditioned on the 
information set available to them. The key factor in this situation is the limited information 
about reference groups or about the selection process leading to reference groups.1 
Alternatively, individuals may fail to consider all the available information, or they may use 
it incorrectly (Simon, 1972).  For example, agents may use heuristics or rules of thumb when 
dealing with difficult questions of statistical inference, and such rules of thumb can, on 
occasion, be very imprecise. Indeed, the use of heuristics in statistical inference and the 
systematic biases that such exercise entails is a well-documented phenomenon in the 
                                                 
1 A special case is given by a complete lack of information about a subgroup of the population. If )x|P(i ijS  
is zero for some xi (i.e., the individual does not observe some income ranges with probability one), then even 
with the ability to make probability judgments and with full knowledge of   )x|P(i ijS the agent will still not 
be able to apply Bayes’ rule. 
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cognitive literature (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). The most relevant case in this 
discussion is the representativeness heuristic, in which individuals fail to apply Bayes’ rule to 
the information they obtain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
This failure leads to a systematic cognitive bias, the base rate neglect.2 
These two possibilities, limitations in information and bounded rationality, can be 
illustrated by a situation in which a “naïve” agent does not properly apply Bayes’ rule as in 
equation (2). In the extreme case, irrespective of the source of the bias, the naïve agent will 
simply use the information about the income distribution within his or her reference group as 
if it were representative of the entire population. The beliefs of naïve agents in this extreme 
case are denoted by the superscript N: )(xf i
N
j . Equation (3) establishes the relationship 














     (3) 
From )(xf i
N
j  it is straightforward to obtain the naïve estimates of many characteristics 
of the income distribution, like the mean, median, dispersion, and proportion of individuals 
under the poverty line, )(xF poor
N
j , among others. Therefore, any biases in )(xf i
N
j  are likely to 
generate biases in a wide set of perceptions of the income distribution. 
If the formation of reference groups is orthogonal to income, then the selection 
equation will be such that )P(i)x|P(i i jj SS  ; that is, on expectation, every group will 
be representative of the whole population. In this case, it would be consistent to use the 
within-group distribution as an estimate of the distribution for the entire population. The 
selection equation, however, is probably a function of income. A probability )x|P(i ijS  
increasing in ix  represents the case of an agent j who has a “rich” reference group and is 
therefore more likely to observe higher-income individuals. Conversely, if agent j interacts 
mainly with lower-income individuals (i.e., a “poor” reference group), then )x|P(i ijS  is 
decreasing in ix . 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1a depicts the income distribution for the whole 
population and for a rich reference group, which exhibits fist-order stochastic dominance 
over the distribution for the whole population (i.e., for every income level in the reference 
group there is a greater share of people below that income level than in the whole 
                                                 
2 The base rate neglect has been incorporated in economic models and empirical applications before (see 
Grether, 1980, 1990; Rabin, 1998; Camerer et al., 2003; DellaVigna, 2009). 
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population). Since naïve agents use the information about the income distribution within their 
reference group as if it were representative of the entire population, naïve agents in the rich 
reference group will underestimate the actual cumulative income distribution for every 
income level, i.e., F(y)(y)FN  for all y. In Figure 1a, this is illustrated for a given income 
1y  by the difference between the areas filled with horizontal and vertical lines. Conversely, 
naïve agents with poor reference groups will overestimate the cumulative income distribution 
for every income y. The results are not straightforward when there is no stochastic dominance 
of the distribution within a reference group over that of the whole population. Figure 1b 
illustrates this result by showing a “middle-class” reference group, where agents 
underestimate F(y) for income levels y<y* and overestimate F(y) for incomes y>y*. 
There is an intuitive way to relate the size and direction of the bias in (y)FNj   to the 
selection process for reference groups, )x|P(i ijS . Taking the integral of equation (3) from 



































  (4) 
The term (y)jR  represents the average probability of belonging to group jS  for 
individuals with incomes below y . If agent j has a rich reference group, those with incomes 
lower than y have a lower probability of belonging to the rich reference group than the 
average of this probability for the entire population, so 
jSj
R P(y)  . As a result, agents with 
rich reference groups underestimate the entire cumulative distribution function: 
F(y)(y)FNj  for all y. 
The expression )(xf i
N
j  in equation (3) can be used to compute naïve perceptions of 
different moments and statistics of the income distribution. For instance, if reference groups 
are more homogeneous in income than the whole population (as it is likely to be the case), 
perceptions about income inequality will be biased downwards for all agents. Indeed, this is 
consistent with Norton and Ariely’s (2011) finding that individuals systematically under-
estimate the level of inequality in the distribution of wealth in the United States.  
A crucial parameter for this study is )(xF j
N
j , the perception of an agent’s own income 
rank within the distribution. Since agents with rich reference groups underestimate all points 
in the cumulative distribution (including jx ), it follows that they will underestimate their own 
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rank in the distribution. Conversely, naïve agents with poor reference groups will over-
estimate their rank. 
Finally, it is important to note that these naïve estimates represent extreme cases in 
which agents completely fail to take into account the selection process of their reference 
group. The model can be generalized by letting individuals make imperfect inferences using 
some information about the selection equation, )x|P(i ijS . If the individual under-
estimates the importance of income in the formation of reference groups, then the biases will 
be qualitatively similar to those presented in the extreme naïve case.  
 
2.2 Biased perceptions and preferences for redistribution 
Misperceptions of income distribution can have substantial implications in the 
determination of policy outcomes.  This can be illustrated by incorporating biased 
perceptions into a basic Meltzer and Richard (1981) type of framework with a simple 
redistributive policy reform in which taxes would finance some benefits. The population can 
be divided by income levels into potential net losers and winners: individuals above a given 
 -quantile would lose in net terms if the redistributive policy were implemented, while those 
below it would gain from the reform. For instance, with a linear income tax and lump-sum 
redistribution, agents below the median income will benefit and those above the median will 
lose.  
If agents have biased perceptions of their own income ranking, their evaluations of 
how these costs and benefits will affect them are likely to be inaccurate. The agents that will 
benefit from the policy are those whose actual relative income is below the  -quantile: 
)F(y j . Since they are relatively poor, most of these agents are likely to have poor 
reference groups, and naïve agents among them will therefore over-estimate their own 
ranking. Some of these naïve agents will consider themselves potential non beneficiaries of 
the reform, since their perceived relative income is above the  -quantile: )(yFNj j . Thus, 
there will be a group of agents who erroneously believe that they would not benefit from 
further income redistribution when they actually would: i.e., those with incomes between 
  -1Fy L  and     -1jFy NH  . With access to the correct information about their actual 
income rank, self-interest would make these individuals change their attitude and favor, 
rather than oppose, the redistributive policy. Analogously, a group of naïve individuals with 
rich reference groups will believe that they would benefit from the redistributive policy, 
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although they would actually be net contributors. If those individuals are purely self-
interested, providing them with consistent information about their income ranking would 
make them oppose, rather than favor, the redistributive policy. The experimental design of 
the survey used in this study allows for a direct test of this mechanism. 
However, this simple framework has some shortcomings. The recent political 
economy literature has discussed at length the fact that individuals may be motivated by more 
than self-interest, so preferences for redistribution may reflect a wider set of factors. For 
instance, agents may have altruistic motives and incorporate fairness considerations into their 
decisions regarding their support for redistribution.3 As discussed above, the biases given by 
equation (3) translate into biased perceptions of many characteristics of the distribution of 
income, including the poverty count and social welfare, which could influence an individual’s 
support towards redistributive policies through altruistic concerns. The simplest illustration is 
that of aggregate deprivation. With a poverty line z, F(z) is the actual poverty headcount and 
)(FNj z  its biased perceived level. Naïve individuals with rich (poor) reference groups will 
underestimate (overestimate) the aggregate poverty headcount.4 If preferences for 
redistribution are increasing in the perceived poverty level, then altruistic naïve agents with 
rich (poor) reference groups would support more (less) redistribution upon correcting their 
biased perceptions. As a result, providing consistent information to naïve individuals may 
have conflicting effects in terms of their support for redistribution from the perspective of 
selfish and altruistic motives. The experiment described below, however, identifies only the 
net effect of providing consistent information on the income distribution on attitudes towards 
redistributive policies. 
 
                                                 
3 Fong (2001), Luttmer (2001), Rottemberg (2002), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005) study the effect of altruistic and fairness concerns on attitudes towards redistribution. See Alesina and 
Giuliano (2009) for more references. 
4 This conclusion is part of a more general result. For any social welfare function increasing in income (Cowell, 
2000), first-order stochastic dominance of an income distribution over another implies that social welfare under 
the first distribution is greater than social welfare under the second distribution. If the distribution of incomes in 
the rich (poor) neighborhood dominates (is dominated by) the distribution in the whole population, it follows 
that naïve individuals in the rich (poor) reference groups will overestimate (underestimate) true social welfare. 
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3 Data source and experimental setup: Survey on Distributional 
Perceptions and Redistribution 
3.1 Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution 
The discussion in the previous section covered the formation of subjective income 
distributions, the possibility of systematic biases, and their implications for attitudes towards 
redistribution. The empirical investigation in this paper is based on the Survey on 
Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution, a study of 1,100 households representative of 
Greater Buenos Aires in Argentina. The survey was carried out in March 2009 and consisted 
of face-to-face interviews of a random sample of that population. It was specifically designed 
to test the model presented in the previous section and, to that end, collected data on a set of 
individual and household characteristics and on respondents’ labor-market and other 
socioeconomic outcomes, as well as their answers to a series of questions about their political 
views and attitudes. It also gathered information on the respondents’ actual household income 
and on their perceptions of their own income rank within the distribution for the whole 
country.  
There are several ways of recovering subjective probability distributions for a 
continuous variable such as income, which include eliciting quantiles, moments or points of 
the distribution (see Manski, 2004). For instance, Norton and Ariely (2011) collected 
information on respondents’ evaluations of the proportional distribution of total wealth 
among quintiles in the United States. The Survey on Distributional Perceptions and 
Redistribution relied on an original instrument (the income-rank evaluation question), which 
elicited a specific value of the cumulative subjective distribution: its evaluation at the point 
where each respondent thought his or her household stood.5 The question was worded as 
follows: “There are 10 million families in Argentina. Of those 10 million, how many do you 
think have an income lower than yours?”6 The survey also collected data on the households’ 
total monthly income by intervals. While distributional indicators often rely on per capita or 
adjusted income, a pilot conducted in December 2007 indicated that individuals compare 
incomes in terms of total household monthly levels. The intervals were chosen by the 
research team to correspond to the boundaries of deciles of national total household income 
                                                 
5 Nuñez (2005) collected information about the respondents’ evaluation of the percentage of households above 
and below their income level in Chile. The approximate number of households in Argentina at the time of the 
survey (10 million) allowed the question to be phrased in terms of millions of households on a simple 1-10 
scale, thus eliminating the need for respondents to be comfortable in answering in percentage terms. 
6 This information differs conceptually from measures of subjective economic welfare (Ravallion and Lokshin, 
2002), since it attempts to capture an objective parameter of the distribution. In this sense, it is closer to the 
literature on elicitation of subjective probabilities (Hurd, 2009). 
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distribution at the time of the survey to facilitate the comparison of objective and perceived 
position in the distribution in the experimental design.7 
 
3.2 The survey experiment setup 
Besides the income rank question, the second and most innovative aspect of the 
survey was the implementation of an experimental design incorporated into the questionnaire. 
Randomized questionnaire-experiments had been developed in laboratory settings (Amiel and 
Cowell, 1992; Cowell and Cruces, 2004), while, in the context of household surveys, Joliffe 
(2001) and Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2008) have randomized the allocation of 
questionnaire types among respondents.8 
As in these previous studies, the experimental setup for this survey involved randomly 
allocating two different types of questionnaires to interviewees, although the questions asked 
to the respondents were the same. The originality of this setup stems from the nature of the 
treatment, in which the interviewer provided feedback to respondents in the treatment group 
in the form of consistent information on the income distribution. Specifically, after collecting 
information on household characteristics, income levels and positional perceptions, the 
interviewer informed respondents in the treatment group whether their estimates of relative 
income coincided with those of the research team. The interviewer read the following 
statement (with X and Y being determined by previous answers): “Based on your income 
level, the latest studies conducted by the University indicate that there are X million families 
with an income lower than yours, while you stated that there were Y.” The interviewer then 
read out one of the three following statements, depending on the accuracy of the X/Y 
comparison: (1) “In fact, there are more families with a lower income than yours than you 
believed”, (2) “You were right about how many families have a lower income than yours”, or 
(3) “In fact, there are fewer families with a lower income than yours than you believed.” The 
presence of a bias in their perceptions was thus explicitly pointed out to respondents in the 
treatment group. After the treatment, the questionnaire was used to collect information on 
attitudes about specific redistributive policies of interest in Argentina within the political 
context existing at the time of the survey. The questionnaire for the control group did not 
                                                 
7 The use of income intervals significantly reduces non-response rates. The notes in appendix table A1 provide 
further details on the construction of the intervals and their implementation by interviewers in the survey. 
8 Survey experiments have also been conducted in the context of political science and public opinion research 
(see, for instance, Horiuchi et al., 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). 
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contain the “feedback” section, but was exactly the same in all other respects (Table A1 
presents an extract of the questionnaire and variable definitions).  
This experimental survey design contributes to a growing body of literature 
concerning the provision of information as a treatment in an experimental setting. For 
example, Duflo and Saez (2003) and Chetty and Saez (2009) provided subjects with 
information on retirement plans and the tax code, respectively, while Jensen’s (2010) study 
offered statistics on returns to schooling for teenagers, and Card et al. (2010) gave a group of 
employees access to information on co-workers’ wages. There are also several studies that 
have contrasted subjective and objective probabilities and their relationship with actual 
outcomes in connection with, for instance, income expectations versus realizations (Manski, 
2004), objective versus subjective income percentiles (Nuñez, 2005) and perceived versus 
actual survival rates (Hurd, 2009). This study innovated in a crucial way, however, by 
confronting subjects with consistent information which differed from their stated perceptions.  
 
4 Empirical results and discussion 
4.1 Subjective income distributions 
This section presents the empirical evidence from the Survey on Distributional 
Perceptions and Redistribution. The starting point for the analysis is the distribution of 
objective and perceived income rank in the sample. Figure 2a presents the income 
distribution of the Greater Buenos Aires survey sample as a function of deciles of the national 
distribution at the time of the survey, which served as the basis for the categories used for the 
household income question. A nationally representative sample would be depicted in the 
figure as a horizontal line at the 10 percent density. The higher concentration in deciles 5 to 9 
is accounted for by higher average income levels in Buenos Aires with respect to the country 
average. Figure 2b, in turn, presents the respondents’ perceptions of their households’ 
positions in the distribution, which were elicited by posing the income-rank evaluation 
question described in the previous section. By construction, respondents identified what 
decile of the national distribution they thought was the closest to their income level. In 
contrast with the fairly even distribution in Figure 2a, the mode of the perceptions 
distribution is given by the fifth decile, with almost 30 percent of respondents placing their 
households at that level (and almost half in the middle quintile – corresponding to the fifth 
and sixth deciles). Self-perceptions of income rank in the sample are thus substantially less 
dispersed than objective income levels are. 
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The difference between the two panels in Figure 2 indicates the presence of a bias in 
distributional perceptions. The bias is defined here as the difference between a household’s 
objective income decile and the respondent’s self-assessment of its position (in deciles): those 
with a negative bias consider themselves to be in a lower position than they really are, while 
the opposite is true for those with a positive bias. The distribution of this variable, depicted in 
Figure 3a, indicates that there are a significant number of cases of both positive and negative 
biases. In fact, only about 15 percent of the respondents place their household’s income in the 
objectively correct decile. However, the deciles of a national income distribution are 
relatively narrow categories, and it is therefore quite plausible that respondents could have 
difficulty in ascertaining their position with that degree of precision. To allow for 
measurement error in agents’ perceptions (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and in the levels 
of the objective decile boundaries, Figure 3b presents an alternative definition of this bias. 
Here, only respondents who deviate from their true position by two deciles or more are 
considered to be biased. As expected, the number of biased responses is substantially lower 
than in Figure 3a. However, Figure 3b still indicates that, even with this less demanding 
definition, more than 55 percent of the respondents exhibit some degree of bias, with 
relatively more cases of negative biases (individuals placing themselves below their true 
ranking) than positive ones. 
A further question is whether there is a relationship between the distributions depicted 
in Figure 2. Table 1 and Figure 4 present the relationship between objective and perceived 
relative income levels. Figure 4a depicts the average of perceived own-income deciles, by 
levels of objective deciles. There is a significant positive relationship between both variables, 
although the distribution of subjective levels is considerably more concentrated. For instance, 
the average perceived own-income decile fluctuates around 4.5 for the three poorest deciles 
of the objective income distribution, but is less than 7 for those in the top objective decile. 
This pattern has a direct correlate for the distribution of the bias, which is depicted in Figure 
4b as a function of the objective income decile: respondents at the top and the bottom of the 
objective distribution display substantial negative and positive biases, respectively (of about  
-3.5 and 3 deciles for the extreme categories). Moreover, the bias diminishes up to the fifth 
objective decile and increases monotonically (in absolute values) from the sixth decile 
onward. Table 1 presents similar information on the bias for a partition of the population in 
quintiles of the objective income distribution. The table also indicates that positive biases are 
largely confined to respondents below the median of the distribution, while those with a 
negative bias are concentrated in the fourth and fifth quintiles. 
 
 14
4.2 Reference groups and biased perceptions of income distribution 
The discussion so far has revealed the presence of substantial biases in distributional 
perceptions. Section 2 posited a mechanism for the formation of subjective income 
distributions, whereby individuals extrapolated from information about the income 
distribution in their reference groups in order to obtain estimates of the whole distribution. 
Sophisticated agents (rational and informed) can obtain a consistent estimate of the aggregate 
distribution even if their reference group is not fully representative by correctly applying 
Bayes’ rule (that is, accounting for the selection process of the sample that they are 
observing). By contrast, a “naïve” individual fails to apply this rule and considers only his or 
her reference group when making inferences about the whole population; this results in 
systematic biases if selection into reference groups is a function of income. 
If reference groups bundle together individuals of similar income levels, then one 
simple prediction of the model is that individuals with rich reference groups (and therefore 
most rich individuals) tend to underestimate their income rank, whereas individuals with poor 
reference groups (and therefore most poor individuals) overestimate their rank. This 
distribution of biases is exactly the one depicted in the results above, most notably in Figure 
4b and Table 1. However, the observed pattern is also consistent with other potential 
explanations. For instance, individuals may have a tendency to the mean (or the median), as 
has actually been documented in the literature on expectations and subjective probabilities,9 
such that the middle deciles constitute focal-point answers to the income-rank question. 
Alternatively, poorer respondents may feel embarrassed to admit that their relative income is 
low and thus over-report their true (accurate) perception, while richer individuals may not 
feel comfortable reporting their high relative position10 and thus under-report their true 
(accurate) perception. The survey allows for the use of a series of empirical means of testing 
the reference-group hypothesis against these simple mechanical explanations. 
In the discussion presented in Section 2, the entire set of individual interactions (with 
friends, family, co-workers, etc.) was regarded as constituting the relevant reference group 
for the formation of perceptions of income distribution. The analysis here uses a geographical 
                                                 
9 Hurd (2009) points out that “when the true probability of an event is greater than 0.50 […] the subjective 
probability will be understated” and vice versa, and finds several examples of survey responses with focal points 
at 50 for distributions between 0 and 100. Similar factors might be at work in the evaluation of income 
distributions. For instance, 50.4 percent of respondents in the 1972-2008 pooled General Social Surveys in the 
United States stated that their income was “about average” (own tabulations). 
10 Under-reporting of income for higher levels is typically a concern in household surveys. However, in this 
case, the tendency of those with higher income levels to underestimate their position implies that under-
reporting at the top of the distribution would reduce the number of those classified as biased. The substantial 
number of respondents with a negative bias can be considered to be a lower bound. 
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approximation: an individual’s reference group is given by his or her area of residence. This 
approximation is justified by the significance of social networks at the neighborhood level for 
the exchange of information on employment and other income-generating activities (Topa, 
2001; Bayer et al., 2008).11 Moreover, areas of residence provide a simple illustration for a 
reference-group selection mechanism based on income levels, given the pervasive residential 
segregation of households by income levels in urban areas (Glaeser et al., 2008). 
The survey covered 41 randomly selected sampling points within 10 localities of the 
Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area. The sampling points correspond to a fairly small set 
of street blocks and contain 26 households on average – these are referred to as 
“neighborhoods” in the discussion. The average objective income level reported in the survey 
within each neighborhood is depicted along the horizontal axis of Figure 5a. This figure 
reveals substantial variation in average incomes for neighborhoods in the sample, which 
range from an average objective decile of 3 to just below 8. 
The hypothesis that a salient role is played by geographic reference groups in the 
formation of distributional perceptions (and misperceptions) predicts a strong relationship 
between the economic level of the residence area (as a proxy for the reference group) and the 
direction of the biases. Figure 5a illustrates the strong positive correlation between average 
income levels and average perceptions at the neighborhood level.12 Figure 5b, in turn, fits the 
prediction of the model discussed in Section 2: individuals in lower-income neighborhoods 
(i.e., with average objective income ranks below 4.5) overestimate, on average, their income 
rank (positive average bias), and individuals in higher-income neighborhoods (i.e., with 
average income ranks above 6.5) underestimate, on average, their income rank (negative 
average bias). The model also predicts that agents in “middle-class” neighborhoods will have 
a balanced mix of positive and negative biases, possibly generating a zero average bias. This 
is indeed the case for neighborhoods with average income deciles between 4.5 and 6.5. 
This evidence suggests a role for geographic reference groups in the determination of 
subjective income distributions, since the above predictions are specific to the reference-
group hypothesis.13 The information collected in the survey allows for a sharper test. The 
discussion in Section 2 pointed out that fully naïve agents will report their positions within 
                                                 
11 The income comparisons literature, which focuses mainly on the impact of relative income on subjective well-
being, also employs geographical definitions of reference groups (see the review of Clark et al., 2008). 
12 The correlations in both panels of Figure 5 also hold by locality. Where possible, indicators aggregated at the 
geographical level are based on neighborhoods rather than localities to provide greater variation in the figures.   
13 For instance, if respondents to the survey simply provided a focal-point answer (5 plus/minus some random 
term) in reply to the question on the perceived own-income rank, there should be no relationship between 
average income and average perception by geographical area. 
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their reference groups as their perceptions of their income ranks within the whole population. 
On the other hand, under the null hypothesis that individuals correctly apply Bayes’ rule, 
relative income within a reference group should not have any explanatory power for 
perceived income rank within the population as a whole after controlling for the agent’s 
objective income rank. More specifically, under the alternative hypothesis that individuals 
under-estimate the importance of income in the formation of reference groups, then the 
relative income within the reference group will be positively correlated to their perceptions of 
income ranking.14 
Table 2 presents a series of tests of this hypothesis that employ regression analysis. In 
all regressions, the perceived own-income decile is the dependent variable.15 Column 1 
presents a simple regression with the respondents’ objective income deciles as the sole 
independent variable. The results in this column confirm the strongly significant relationship 
between the two variables discussed above. The level of the coefficient, however, reflects the 
differences in values between the two variables. This can be seen in Figure 4a: in a perfect 
information context, the objective income variable should have a coefficient of 1 and the 
regression should have an r-square of 1. The estimate is strongly significant, but the 
coefficient is only 0.2452. The second column repeats this simple regression, but includes 41 
neighborhood fixed effects:16 the coefficient is slightly lower, at about 0.201, and still 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
The first direct test of the geographic reference group hypothesis is presented in 
column 3. The regression includes the respondents’ income rank within their localities (the 
number of households within sampling points is too small to provide a meaningful measure), 
transformed to the 1-10 scale of the objective and subjective income decile variables. With 
the inclusion of the locality rank variable as an independent variable, the coefficient of the 
objective income decile variable is virtually zero, and not significant at standard levels. The 
coefficient of the locality rank variable, on the other hand, has a positive and statistically 
significant effect of 0.2151 on the perceived own-income decile. The respondents’ relative 
incomes within their localities thus seem to have an effect on their perceptions of the 
distribution, over and above that of their own objective income levels. The coefficient is 
                                                 
14 However, in principle it could also be the case that the individual over-estimates the role of income in forming 
reference groups. If that was the case, then the relative income within reference groups would be negatively 
correlated to the perceptions of income ranking. 
15 Regressions with the bias as the dependent variable do not convey meaningful results because, by 
construction, the bias is strongly correlated with the objective income decile. 
16 Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. All the results in the table are maintained if 10 locality 
fixed effects (with robust standard errors) are included instead. 
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economically significant and is close to that of the objective income level in the simple 
regressions of columns 1 and 2. This result does not arise from a high collinearity between 
objective income and rank within locality, as shown by the regression in column 4, which 
includes objective income deciles as a series of 9 dummy variables. Even with this semi-
parametric control for objective income, the coefficient of relative income within a locality is 
statistically significant and about the same in size as in column 3, and the F-test rejects the 
joint significance of the objective income dummies with a p-value of 0.24. 
The following column in Table 2 presents the results of another robustness check. A 
potential concern may be that the measure of objective income is imprecise, so that the 
locality income rank variable may be indirectly capturing the effects of unobserved variations 
in actual income levels. The model in column 5 includes a set of additional regressors 
consisting of individual and household characteristics to proxy for the respondent’s income-
generating capacity (his or her education level, that of his or her spouse, age, gender, type of 
employment – see the Table’s notes for details). If the locality rank captures some of the 
omitted variables, its coefficient should decrease substantially with the introduction of these 
controls. The results shown in column 5 of Table 2 indicate that adding this exhaustive set of 
controls does not significantly alter the point estimate or the statistical significance of the 
coefficient of the rank within locality variable, and these results are robust to the inclusion of 
further controls. 
Finally, Table 2 also presents the results of a further test of the reference group 
hypothesis. The survey included a question intended to measure the breadth of respondents’ 
reference groups: “Among your friends and co-workers, would you say that there are 
individuals from all social classes (1), or, if not, that most of your friends belong to the lower 
class (2), the middle class (3), or the upper class (4)?” The response is used to generate a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an individual responded that his or her friends are 
from all social classes (38.5 percent of the respondents), and zero otherwise. Intuitively, 
people that interact in several reference groups must have more information about the role of 
income in forming reference groups (or alternatively, the selection process is more salient to 
them, so they are less likely to fail to consider Bayes’ rule). As a consequence, they should be 
less prone to report their relative position within their locality as an estimate of their ranking 
in the entire distribution. The regression shown in column 6 includes the indicator variable 
for having friends from all social classes, as well as an interaction of this indicator with the 
respondent’s income rank within the locality. The coefficient of this interaction should be 
negative: conditional on their own objective income level, these individuals should be less 
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influenced by the relative income within their reference group.17 The results obtained from 
this test also support the reference group hypothesis: the coefficient of the interaction term is 
negative and both statistically and economically significant. 
The empirical results shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are consistent with the factors 
highlighted in the discussion in Section 2. Systematic biases in subjective income 
distributions are manifested here as deviations in the perception of own-income rank. A 
significant percentage of poorer individuals place themselves in higher positions, while a 
significant proportion of richer individuals think that they are closer to the median than they 
really are. Moreover, the results confirm the salient role played by reference groups (proxied 
by area of residence) in the formation of subjective income distributions. As predicted, there 
is a positive relationship between an individual’s perception of income ranking and relative 
position within the individual’s area of residence, over and above the effect of the 
individual’s objective income level. Also in line with the predictions, individuals with friends 
from heterogeneous social backgrounds are less prone to be biased by their relative rank in 
their area of residence.  
 
4.3 Biased perceptions and preferences for redistribution: experimental 
results 
The empirical evidence presented so far illustrates the degree of bias in distributional 
perceptions, and the following analysis assesses their relevance for attitudes towards 
redistribution. Studying the effect of distributional misperceptions on political attitudes poses 
a significant identification challenge, since preferences for redistribution are significantly 
correlated with income levels (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), which are in turn closely linked 
to an individual’s perceived position and the resulting bias, as illustrated by the results in 
Table 1 and Figure 4. A simple analysis of political attitudes by objective and perceived level 
of income would thus be marred by this spurious correlation problem. This section presents 
an original empirical test to determine whether these misperceptions may affect economic 
decision-making. The test was designed to overcome these identification difficulties and to 
illustrate how misperceptions can have first-order implications for economic and political 
processes through their impact on individuals’ attitudes towards redistribution and related 
policies.  
                                                 
17 In an extreme case, if this variable indicates that the respondent has full information on the selection process, 




As described in Section 3, the survey included a field questionnaire-experiment: the 
interviewer provided a randomly assigned group of respondents with “correct” (i.e., 
unbiased) estimates of their positions in the income distribution based on their responses. The 
interviewer explicitly pointed out the degree and direction of the bias in each respondent’s 
self-assessment (if any). The experiment thus identifies the causal effect of this information 
treatment on preferences for redistribution. Moreover, to the degree that the treatment 
manages to correct biased distributional perceptions,18 the results can be interpreted as 
capturing evidence of the effect of misperceptions on political attitudes. 
The focus in this study is on attitudes towards a specific set of policies rather than on 
general beliefs about justice and income redistribution. The policies under study consist of 
direct government transfers to the poor. These policies were especially important in the 
context of the population under study, since the extension of family allowances (cash 
transfers which were made only to formal-sector workers, i.e., those with higher incomes) to 
the poor was a controversial issue in Argentina at the time the survey was implemented in 
March 2009, a few months before a national midterm election. Opposition political parties, 
unions, academics and non-governmental organizations (including the Catholic Church) 
campaigned intensively for this policy measure, which was finally implemented by the 
federal government in November 2009 (Cruces and Gasparini, 2010). The public debate at 
the time of the survey focused on this specific policy measure and on the details of its 
coverage and implementation. Finally, apart from their salience in the political debate, 
another advantage of studying these policies is that government direct transfer programs can 
reach a substantial proportion of the population and can be fairly accurately targeted to the 
poor (unlike most of Argentina’s public expenditure; see Gasparini and Cruces, 2010). This 
implies that low-income respondents faced a significant probability of being directly affected 
by policy changes in this area.19 
The questionnaire was used to gather information on relevant socioeconomic 
characteristics of the respondents and their households and on their perceived and objective 
                                                 
18 The information treatment in this context consists of a reduced number of sentences concerning the income 
distribution and a statement pointing out discrepancies. This is a substantially weaker treatment than that used in 
some other studies, such as the information provided about taxes and benefits in Chetty and Saez (2009). The 
significant results presented in the following pages are thus all the more remarkable, since they stem from a 
relatively limited treatment. 
19 The most recent experience was a well-targeted emergency program implemented in 2002, which covered 20 
percent of the households in the country. The new family allowances program reached the same level of 
coverage and targeting in 2010, a year after its implementation (see Cruces and Gasparini, 2010, for a detailed 
account of both programs). The public debate on social policy at the time of the survey thus covered issues that 
could potentially have a direct impact on lower-income households.  
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positions in the distribution. The post-treatment questions20 in the survey were designed to 
capture respondents’ views on some of the prominent aspects of the public debate on 
distributional policy changes: whether to provide transfers to the poor or not and, if so, their 
modality (in cash, in kind or in some form of employment intermediation). The main variable 
for the analysis consisted of an indicator of strong pro-redistribution attitudes, which was 
equal to 1 for respondents who supported these three forms of government assistance 
simultaneously. Only 12.8 percent of the respondents in the overall sample (without 
distinguishing between the treatment and control groups) exhibited this high degree of 
support for redistribution. As expected, this proportion decreased monotonically with income 
levels, from a high of 21.2 percent for the poorest quintile of the sample to only 7 percent for 
the top quintile. 
With respect to the components of this composite variable, the survey respondents 
were first asked: “Do you think that the government should help poor people by giving them 
money?” This question was answered positively by 14.7 percent of the interviewees (ranging 
from 23.2 in the bottom quintile to 9.5 percent in the top quintile). The survey also included 
what was essentially the same question but in reference to food. This type of in-kind transfer 
was supported by 33.5 percent of respondents, with the percentage also decreasing 
monotonically by income level (42.1 to 22.1 percent for the same quintiles as above). Finally, 
respondents were asked if the government should help the poor “by providing them with a 
job”; this option was supported by 98 percent of the respondents, with a virtually constant 
proportion across income groups.21 The correlation between the answers to the questions 
about money and food is 0.44 and significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates that the 
joint analysis of these responses (in the composite variable) is warranted. In addition, they 
should also be studied independently of one another, since a substantial proportion of the 
information provided by the responses to each of these questions does not overlap.22  
While the experiment consisted of providing information to the respondent, its setup 
provided for three alternative treatments. For individuals with positive biases (those who 
perceive themselves as being above their actual objective position), the interviewer 
                                                 
20 Table A2 in the appendix presents the differences in pre-treatment variables (i.e., the questions asked before 
the intervention by the interviewer in the treatment questionnaire) by treatment status. A simultaneous test 
indicates that these differences are not significantly different from zero. 
21 While the low level of variation in this variable implies that it cannot be studied independently, it is included 
as a component of the overall “strong support for redistribution/government assistance to the poor” indicator. 
22 There are several reasons for the divergence between responses to the questions concerning the provision of 
assistance in the form of money and in the form of food. Most notably, respondents tend to prefer in-kind 
transfers (such as food transfers) because of paternalistic concerns (i.e., the belief that the poor might not spend 
cash on the “right” goods).  
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highlighted the fact that, according to the existing estimates, there were actually fewer 
households with a lower income level (i.e., they had overestimated their rank). On the other 
hand, individuals with negative biases (those who perceive themselves as being below their 
actual objective position) were informed that there were actually more households with a 
lower income than theirs (i.e., their position in the distribution was higher than they had 
thought). Finally, for those whose estimation coincided with the existing estimates, the 
interviewer simply pointed this out. These three treatment groups must be analyzed 
separately, because they provided the respondent with different types of information: 
overestimation, underestimation and confirmation of the respondent’s own position. 
In view of the discussion in Section 2, these treatments might be expected to have 
substantially different impacts on stated attitudes towards redistribution. Self-interest should 
induce those who overestimated their own rank to demand more redistribution (in the form of 
government assistance to the poor), since the treatment will make them more likely to 
consider themselves as potential beneficiaries of this type of policy. For those who 
underestimated their rank, the treatment implies that they will learn that they are richer and 
thus that they are less likely to benefit from the help towards the poor, so self-interest should 
induce them to demand less redistribution (although, as discussed later, altruistic concerns 
can override this effect). Finally, for respondents with no bias, the treatment simply confirms 
their perception of their position in the distribution; they do not receive any new information, 
and thus the treatment should be immaterial to their political attitudes. An impact of the 
treatment for this group would imply an effect of the interviewer’s statement independent of 
its content, which could be difficult to separate from that of the actual information provided.23 
Table 3 presents the mean levels of the preferences for redistribution variables (strong 
support, help with money and help with food) and a fourth dependent variable, which equals 1 
if the respondent reports having made a donation in the recent past (this is used as a false 
experiment, as discussed below.) The results are presented for each of the treatment 
subgroups: those with a strictly negative bias, those with a zero bias, and those with a strictly 
positive bias. The first two lines in each panel display the means for each dependent variable 
by treatment status. The following line shows the difference between the two and the p-value 
of the mean difference test. Finally, the last line in each panel presents the results from the 
regression version of the test, i.e., the coefficient of the treatment indicator in an OLS 
                                                 
23 An effect of the treatment for this group could also indicate that the respondent is misreporting his or her 
income level, in which case the true informational content of the interviewer’s statement would not necessarily 
be a confirmation of the respondent’s self-assessment. The fact that there are no significant effects for this group 
suggests that under-reporting is not the driving force behind the revealed biases. 
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regression of the dependent variable, which also includes the individual and household 
controls of columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, as well as neighborhood fixed effects and clustering 
of standard errors at the neighborhood level. More detailed information on these controls is 
provided in the note to the table.24 
The results shown in column 2 of Table 3 indicate that, as predicted, the treatment had 
no statistically discernible effect among those with a zero bias regarding any of the variables. 
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the estimates for individuals with negative biases. These results 
also indicate that the treatment had no statistically significant effect on any of the outcomes 
that were analyzed. Finally, the results for individuals with positive biases (those who 
overestimate their rank) in column 3 point to a series of statistically significant effects. 
Treated individuals in this group exhibited a substantially higher proportion of strong support 
for redistribution (4.4 percentage points higher), support with money (3.5 percentage points) 
and support with food (5.1 percentage points). While the raw differences are just above 
standard significance levels, the conditional treatment effects are all positive and significant 
(at the 10 percent level for strong support and help with money and at the 5 percent level for 
help with food).  
This effect of the information treatment on respondents who overestimated their 
income rank is both statistically and economically significant. It is also robust to a series of 
tests, as shown in columns 4, 5 and 6. A first robustness test involves using not only the sign 
of the bias, but also its intensity: the fifth column excludes those who misperceived their 
correct position by only one decile from those with a positive bias. The remaining individuals 
were informed that a substantially larger gap existed between their perceptions and reality, 
and the results should therefore be stronger. The evidence set forth in Table 3 indicates that 
this is indeed the case: the conditional and unconditional differences are substantially higher, 
and they are significant even for the unconditional t-tests. Columns 5 and 6 present two 
versions of a further robustness check. Individuals who consider their households to be poor 
should exhibit greater support for policies to help the poor in any case – this effect is present 
in the data for the three outcomes considered – and thus should be less affected by 
information that tells them that they are poorer than they thought. On the other hand, 
individuals who consider their households to be non-poor or relatively well-off should be 
more affected by the news that their relative position is lower than they expected. They may 
not want the government to help the poor so long as they do not consider themselves to be 
                                                 
24 As in other small-sample experimental studies, the inclusion of control variables reduces the variability of the 
error term, which increases the statistical power of the significance test of the treatment effect. 
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part of this group, but an innovation in this sense could prompt them to favor redistribution 
out of self-interest, since they will realize that they have a greater probability of benefiting 
from this policy. Column 5 reports the treatment effect for the subset of individuals with 
positive biases who originally thought that their households had incomes equal to or above 
the median income for the general population, while column 6 conditions on those with no 
self-perception of poverty (which was captured in the pre-treatment phase of the survey). As 
expected, the effects are stronger and more significant for both groups than for those with a 
positive bias.25 
Finally, the bottom rows in Table 3 present a false experiment designed to capture the 
presence of spurious effects of the treatment on respondents. These are estimates of treatment 
effects for the variable defined by the post-treatment question: “Have you made any 
donations to an individual or charity during the past 12 months?” The treatment may have 
an effect on stated preferences or demands, but cannot affect past actions. This donation 
variable was chosen because of its strong relationship to assistance to the poor and 
redistribution in general. If, instead of an increased willingness to redistribute, the provision 
of information only manages to induce more caring or generous statements from the 
respondent, then, by a shaming effect or by modifying the perceptions of the distribution, the 
treatment could also have a spurious impact on statements about what the respondent did in 
the past. The results shown in the last rows of Table 3 indicate that there is no significant 
effect of this type for any of the groups considered. 
To sum up, as predicted, the treatment did not have an impact on individuals with no 
bias in their perceptions.26 The lack of significant results for those with negative biases may 
reflect the offsetting effects on preferences from self-interest and altruistic mechanisms. As 
discussed in Section 2, individuals with a negative bias not only underestimate their own 
income rank, but they also underestimate the number of persons who are poor. As a 
consequence, the treatment informs them that there is more poverty than they originally 
thought, which can increase support for redistribution and then offset the selfish channel. 
Finally, respondents who were informed that they were relatively poorer than they had 
thought became more supportive of redistribution to the poor when informed about their true 
                                                 
25 The results are qualitatively similar when conditioning the group with a positive bias to those who thought 
that their households belonged to the lower class or to those who reported having friends who were mainly from 
the lower class. 
26 Moreover, the results of the experiment also back up the findings about the relevance of reference groups for 
the formation of distributional perceptions that were presented in Section 4.2. If individuals know their true rank 
in the distribution but misreport it in the survey (because of embarrassingly low or high relative levels) or report 
focal-point answers because of a lack of interest, the provision of information should have no effect on their 
stated preferences, since they already have this unbiased estimate. 
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income rank. These results are sizeable: the difference in the support for redistribution 
between treatment and control group amounts roughly to half the difference in those variables 
between the top and bottom quintiles of the sample.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The motivation of this paper was the lack of evidence on the accuracy and origins of 
perceptions of the income distribution, which play a crucial (though implicit) role in political 
economy and public finance models. The study proposed a simple mechanism where agents 
extrapolate from their reference group without accounting for the selection process that led to 
their group – either because of informational or cognitive limitations. A tailored household 
survey provided evidence on the salient role of reference groups for the formation of 
subjective distributions, which are significantly correlated with the respondent’s relative 
position within her reference group (as proxied by area of residence), and on the presence of 
sizeable systematic biases in these perceptions in Argentina. The systematic biases 
documented in this paper and their consequences, however, can arise in any society – the 
determinant factor is the sorting of individuals in reference groups by income level. For 
instance, the posited mechanism for the formation of biased perceptions is compatible with 
the systematic downward bias in the perception of wealth inequality in the United States 
documented by Norton and Ariely (2011). 
Furthermore, this study implemented an original survey experiment in the field, where 
a randomly assigned group of respondents were provided consistent information about their 
ranking in the income distribution as a feedback to their responses. Confronting agents’ 
biased perceptions with this information had a significant effect on stated preferences for 
redistribution: those who overestimated their relative position (who thought of themselves to 
be relatively richer than they were) demanded more redistribution. To the degree that the 
information treatment managed to correct biased distributional perceptions, these results can 
be interpreted as evidence of the causal effect of misperceptions on political attitudes. This 
mechanism provides an alternative explanation for the low levels of redistribution observed 
in modern democracies, and since it affects relatively poorer individuals it is reminiscent of 
the Marxian notion of false consciousness.27 Having accurate information about the income 
distribution might induce agents to better calibrate their demands for redistribution. The 
                                                 
27 Olin Wright’s (2009) discussion of false consciousness states: “Ideology is seen as preventing workers from 
understanding the nature of their oppression and the possibilities of its transformation. The absence of effective 
struggle for socialism, then, is at least in part explained by the pervasiveness of these cognitive distortions.” 
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results in this paper support Romer’s (2003) discussion of the possible welfare improving 
effects of subsidizing information, and Besley’s (2007) remarks about the potential of 
information providers for improving policies, although the impact of the biases in the 
efficiency of redistribution should also be considered (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005),   
The role of misconceptions in political economy has been studied before (Romer, 
2003; Slemrod, 2006). While Besley (2007) highlights the benefits from incorporating 
notions of dispersed and limited information for modern political economy, building-in more 
specific factors like biased perceptions of the distribution can further enrich political 
economy models and empirical applications. It can also provide explanations for other 
puzzles in the literature, such as Bartels’ (2005) findings on the support of low income voters 
for tax cuts to the rich and the dissonance between their views on inequality and public 
policy, or Bartels’ (2008) results on the reduced responsiveness of representatives to low 
income voters. More generally, concepts such as inequality, self-interest and the median voter 
can be adapted in their application to political economy outcomes when misperceptions and 
misconceptions play a role. 
The findings in this paper indicate effects of perceptions on stated preferences for 
redistribution. Further research could focus on the impact of biases and information on actual 
behavior – for instance, on charitable donations or on voting patterns. Moreover, the results 
in this paper could originate in either limited information or limited cognitive ability – further 
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Source for all tables: Own calculations based on the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. 
 























Lowest 1.62 4.60 2.98 0.85 3.02 0.04 -0.04
Second 3.47 4.96 1.49 0.71 1.71 0.16 -0.21
Third 5.53 5.38 -0.14 0.30 0.60 0.40 -0.74
Fourth 7.54 5.89 -1.64 0.07 0.09 0.81 -1.73
Highest 9.35 6.48 -2.88 0.00 0.00 0.97 -2.88
Total (N=1060) 6.12 5.60 -0.53 0.30 0.75 0.55 -1.28
 
Notes: the bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile (see Table A1 for 
detailed definitions). 
 
Table 2. Determinants of perceived own income decile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Objective income decile 0.2452 0.2099 -0.0168 F-test† 0.0048 0.0109
[0.0245]*** [0.0280]*** [0.0944] [0.1237] [0.1228]
Rank within locality 0.2151 0.2311 0.2002 0.2288
[0.0868]** [0.1195]* [0.1114]* [0.1096]**




Constant 4.0916 3.8997 4.2961 4.2846 4.1199 3.976
[0.1798]*** [0.2266]*** [0.2659]*** [0.4379]*** [0.6554]*** [0.6709]***
Observations 1054 1054 1054 1054 1045 1045
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22
Neighborhood fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes
Levels of objective decile as indicators No No No Yes No No










Dependent variable: Perceived own income decile
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by neighborhood in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. † F-test 
of joint significance for nine objective income decile indicator variables: p-value of 0.2468. The individual controls in the 
regressions in columns 5 and 6 include the sex of the respondent, whether the respondent is the household head, his or her age, 
indicators for his or her education level (from primary incomplete and lower up to postgraduate degree), whether the respondent has 
a spouse, indicators for the spouse’s education level (if present), whether the respondent is a public employee, whether the 








Difference [p-value] 0.013 [0.708] 0.033 [0.58] 0.045 [0.145] 0.078 [0.058] 0.084 [0.033] 0.079 [0.093]
Conditional diff. [p-value] 0.026 [0.331] 0.025 [0.813] 0.074 [0.093] 0.113 [0.067] 0.112 [0.030] 0.145 [0.024]
Treatment group
Control group
Difference [p-value] 0.003 [0.553] 0.073 [0.246] 0.035 [0.217] 0.092 [0.045] 0.074 [0.060] 0.097 [0.054]
Conditional diff. [p-value] 0.010 [0.637] 0.063 [0.601] 0.084 [0.075] 0.132 [0.056] 0.131 [0.013] 0.186 [0.005]
Treatment group
Control group
Difference [p-value] -0.019 [0.304] 0.034 [0.663] 0.051 [0.180] 0.064 [0.173] 0.060 [0.160] 0.037 [0.310]
Conditional diff. [p-value] -0.024 [0.484] -0.010 [0.928] 0.118 [0.014] 0.124 [0.092] 0.149 [0.032] 0.132 [0.099]
Treatment group
Control group
Difference [p-value] 0.035 [0.883] -0.057 [0.364] -0.023 [0.675] -0.035 [0.712] -0.049 [0.820] -0.038 [0.728]















Positive bias: Treatment tells respondents that 









Government should provide assistance to the poor (strong support)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.100 0.186 0.194 0.200 0.212 0.240
Government should help the poor with money
0.087 0.153 0.148 0.122 0.129 0.161
0.153
0.111 0.226 0.212 0.242 0.227 0.250
0.413
0.303 0.347 0.373
Government should help the poor with food
0.108 0.153 0.176 0.150 0.152
0.687 0.715
0.284 0.381 0.424 0.444 0.422
156-158 304-308
0.381 0.362 0.376
0.845 0.742 0.722 0.764 0.7930.831






Notes: p-value of differences in brackets; numbers in bold indicate significance at the 10 percent level or lower. The test for the 
unconditional difference reports the p-value for μT<μC for cases of negative bias (column 1), μT=μC for those with no bias (column 2) 
and for μT>μC for those with positive bias (columns 3-6). The conditional difference is computed from a regression of the outcome 
of interest against a treatment indicator, neighborhood fixed effects and a series of individual controls. The conditional difference is 
the estimate of the coefficient of the treatment indicator, and the reported p-value (derived from standard errors clustered at the 
neighborhood level) is the significance of this coefficient. The individual controls in the regressions include the sex of the 
respondent, whether the respondent is the household head, his or her age, indicators for his or her education level (from primary 
incomplete and lower up to postgraduate degree), whether the respondent has a spouse, indicators for the spouse’s education level (if 
present), whether the respondent is a public employee, whether the respondent is unionized, and whether the household has any extra 
source of income besides labor earnings. The bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile. 
“Self-perception: median or above” means that the perceived income decile is 6 or higher. “Self-perception: not poor” means that the 
individual did to consider his or her household to be poor (this question preceded the treatment in the questionnaire). See Table A1 









Source (except Figure 1): Own calculations based on the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of differences between population and reference group income distributions  
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Figure 2. Distribution of objective and perceived own income decile 
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Notes: See Table A1 for further definitions. Obs: 1,060. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of bias in perception of own income decile, in number of deciles 
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Bias: Perceived minus objective own income decile
 
Notes: bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile. See Table A1 for further definitions. Obs: 1,060. 
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Figure 4. Average perception of own income decile and bias, by objective income decile 
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Notes: bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile. See Table A1 for further definitions. Obs: 1,060. 
 
Figure 5. Average objective decile, perceived own decile and bias by neighborhood 
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Notes: The average is taken over 41 neighborhoods. Bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile. See 
Table A1 for further definitions. Obs.: 1,060. 
 
 
Appendix tables: Table A1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description - relevant question from the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution March 2009, Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
Objective income decile
The interviewer displayed a table with income ranges computed by the researchers, corresponding to the deciles of the
distribution of total household income for Argentina at the time of the survey. Question: I will show you a Table with levels of
income. Please indicate where, approximately, would you say that your family is located, considering all income in your
household from every concept (work, government transfer programs, pensions, rent, etc.) (1) Less than X; (2) X to Y; ... ;
(10) More than Z.
6.122 2.462 1 10 1060
Perception of own income 
decile
The interviewer made a statement and asked the following question: There are 10 million families in Argentina. Of those 10
million, how many do you think have an income lower than yours? (1) 0 to 1 million; (2) between 1 and 2 millions; … ; (10) 9
to 10 millions.
5.595 1.773 1 10 1060
Bias
The bias is constructed as the level of the objective income decile minus that of the perceived own income decile . It is
negative for those who consider themselves to be in a lower position than they really are, and it is positive for those who
consider themselves to be in a higher position than they really are.
-0.526 2.489 -8 7 1060
Treatment
Half of the sample was assigned to a "treatment" questionnaire with the following specific intervention from the interviewer,
which was not present in the "control" version. The interviewers alternated questionnaire types. The intervention consisted of
comparing the answer from the objective income decile (X) to that of the perception of own income decile (Y) , and stating
accordingly: The interviewer read the following statement (with X and Y being determined by previous answers): “Based on
your income level, the latest studies conducted by the University indicate that there are X million families with an income
lower than yours, while you stated that there were Y.” The interviewer then read out one of the three following statements,
depending on the accuracy of the X/Y comparison: (1) “In fact, there are more families with a lower income than yours than
you believed”, (2) “You were right about how many families have a lower income than yours”, or (3) “In fact, there are fewer
families with a lower income than yours than you believed".
0.514 0.500 0 1 1060
Rank within locality
This variable is constructed using the objective income decile variable for each respondent and computing her ranking within
her area of residence, where the 41 sampling points where aggregated to 10 geographic localities. The rank within the
locality is computed using all observations in each area in the sample, and transformed to a 1-10 scale (as the objective and
subjective income decile variables). It is computed as the number of households with lower income than that of the
respondent divided by the total number of households.
5.419 2.483 1.083 9.779 1060
Respondent has friends 
from all social classes
This is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent states that he or she has friends from all social classes when
asked the question: "Among your friends and co-workers, would you say that there are individuals from all social classes (1),
or, if not, that most of your friends belong to the lower class (2), the middle class (3), or the upper class (4)?"
0.376 0.485 0 1 1060
Self-perception of poverty This is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent answered "Yes" to the question: "Do you think that your family ispoor? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.224 0.417 0 1 1049
Help the poor with money "Do you think that the government should help poor people by giving them money? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.148 0.355 0 1 1049
Help the poor with food "Do you think that the government should help poor people by giving them food? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.336 0.472 0 1 1049
Help the poor find jobs "Do you think that the government should help poor people by helping them to find a good job? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.982 0.133 0 1 1052
Government should provide 
assistance to the poor 
Indicator variable constructed as a function of the three previous questions. Equal to 1 if the respondent answered
affirmatively to these questions, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
0.129 0.336 0 1 1060
Respondent made 
donations in the past 12 "Have you donated money, food or clothes to any charity or individual in need in the past twelve months? Yes (1); No (0)" 0.808 0.394 0 1 1045
Sex (1) Male; (0) Female. 0.489 0.500 0 1 1060
Age Age in years. 49.2 15.4 17 88 1051
Educational level of the 
respondent or his/her 
spouse
Indicator variables for the following categories: (1) Primary incomplete; (2) Primary complete; (3) Secondary incomplete; (4)
Secondary complete; (5) Undergraduate incomplete; (6) Undergraduate complete; (7) Postgraduate. This table reports the
average of these categories for the respondent.
4.049 1.599 1 7 1054
Household head "Are you the head of the household? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.757 0.429 0 1 1060
 
Note: the sample is restricted to the 1,060 observations with non-missing bias information (objective and perceived income decile), which corresponds to the sample analyzed in the paper. 
Further notes below. 
 
Notes to Table A1 
The use of income intervals significantly reduces non-response rates, as shown in a 2007 pilot and in large-
scale international projects such as the Gallup World Poll, which concentrate on total household income rather 
than on its components (Gasparini et al., 2008). The boundaries of the intervals corresponded to actual deciles 
of the distribution, which facilitated the comparison of objective and perceived rank implemented in the 
experimental design.  
To ensure comparability between the objective and subjective income ranks, interviewers were instructed to 
impute the lowest category for respondents who considered that less than 1 million households had a lower 
income than theirs, the next-highest category for those who responded with any number between 1 and 2 
million, and so forth until reaching the highest category (10) for those who reported any number between 9 
and 10 million. 
It should be noted that as a result of the Argentine government’s intervention in the operations of the National 
Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC) in 2007, the availability of reliable household survey microdata and of 
official income distribution indicators was quite limited until 2010. To construct the deciles for 2009, the team 
updated the boundaries of total household monthly income deciles from 2007 using information from 
INDEC’s monthly index of wage levels, which continued to be published. When the results of the 2009 
national household survey became available in 2010, all of the estimated decile boundaries fell within the 95 
percent interval of the actual points in the microdata. 










t ratio of 
difference
Age 49.99 48.50 1.49 -1.6
Head of household indicator 0.760 0.755 0.005 -0.21
Male indicator 0.470 0.490 -0.020 -0.65
Number of adults living in the household 1.809 1.830 -0.021 -0.28
Number of children (14 and below) in household 0.737 0.739 -0.002 -0.04
Number of own children 2.032 1.917 0.115 -1.33
No spouse in household 0.112 0.133 -0.021 -1.06
Household has fixed phone line 0.804 0.832 -0.028 -1.22
Household rents dwelling 0.245 0.221 0.024 -0.94
Number of members working 1.571 1.569 0.002 -0.03
Household receives government transfers (welfare) 0.047 0.042 0.005 -0.39
Household has income sources besides labor earnings 0.079 0.070 0.009 -0.55
Some primary education (complete or incomplete) 0.228 0.216 0.012 -0.47
Some secondary education (complete or incomplete) 0.423 0.413 0.010 -0.34
Some higher education (complete, incomplete or postgraduate) 0.349 0.371 -0.022 -0.75
Housewife 0.169 0.152 0.017 -0.75
Wage earner 0.275 0.294 -0.019 -0.7
Liberal profession 0.166 0.149 0.017 -0.77
Pensioner 0.159 0.123 0.036 -1.71
Looking for a job 0.043 0.077 -0.034 -2.37
Working 0.654 0.689 -0.035 -1.24
Unionized 0.224 0.232 -0.008 -0.33
Public sector worker 0.140 0.138 0.002 -0.08
In formal employment 0.355 0.357 -0.002 -0.08
Perceives household as poor 0.198 0.238 -0.040 -1.62
Log of assessed minimum living income 8.128 8.108 0.020 -0.73
Has friends from all social classes 0.361 0.389 -0.028 -0.98
Perceived own income decile 5.676 5.514 0.162 -1.51
Objective income decile 6.193 6.021 0.172 -1.14
 
Notes: the table includes all 1,115 observations in the database, including those with incomplete or missing answers. Scheffe’s 
method for simultaneous testing provides the critical t-statistic for the significance of each of the tests in the table. For a 95 percent 
level of significance, with tests and 1114 degrees of freedom, the critical value is 6.64. None of the differences is significantly 
different from zero according to this method. 
 
